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Status
Annual
meeting held Feb. 19, 2002
% voting
YES: 6.9%
Shareholder
resolutions face a variety of obstacles. For this reason, it is
considered significant if a resolution garners at least 5% of the
vote. Votes over 10% indicate exceptional shareholder support for
an issue.
Filers
of "social-issue" resolutions generally don't expect their
resolution
to receive a majority vote and be adopted by management. Rather,
filers use these resolutions to get management's attention, and
to raise the issue with other shareholders. They hope to achieve
a vote sufficient to allow them to return the next year.
According
to SEC rules, a resolution must receive 3% of the vote the first
year it is filed, 6% in year two and 10% thereafter in order to
be included on the proxy the following year.
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Disney
Broader Distribution of
Stock Options
WHEREAS, Disneys
compensation policies concentrate large amounts of stock options in the
hands of small numbers of executives. According to Disneys SEC filings,
the companys top five officers (0.004% of Disneys workforce),
control 18.6% of outstanding options;
WHEREAS, in 1996,
Disney granted CEO Michael Eisner 24 million stock options (split adjusted)
in order to align the interests of Mr. Eisner and shareholders. This option
grant represented 26.2% of the total options granted by Disney that year.
WHEREAS, while Mr.
Eisner personally has seen the value of his stock options rise by hundreds
of millions of dollars since1996, Disney shareholders have seen the value
of their investment perform poorly compared to the overall stock market.
From September 30, 1996 (the date of Eisners 24 million share grant)
through August 31, 2001, the total return of Disneys stock was 24.1%,
compared with a 77.0% rise in the Standard & Poors 500 index and a
97.5% rise in the S&P Entertainment Index;
WHEREAS, Over the
1998-2000 period, Business Week ranked Mr. Eisner the second worst CEO
in terms of delivering shareholder value relative to the size of his $699
million pay package. (Business Week, April 16, 2001);
WHEREAS, there is
a growing body of research confirming that firms with broad-based employee
ownership grow faster, create more jobs, and retain higher quality employees
than firms with narrowly concentrated ownership. According to "Unleashing
the Power of Employee Ownership," a 1999 report by Northwesterns
Kellogg School of Management and the management consulting firm Hewitt
Associates, firms with broad-based stock ownership delivered superior
stock market performance and profitability relative to peer firms without
employee ownership. Kellogg/Hewitt studied all 380 public firms that established
employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) between 1971 and 1991 and found
that in the four years following the adoption of an ESOP firms saw their
stock price cumulatively outperform peer firms without widespread employee
ownership by 7%. In addition, the return on average assets of firms with
broad-based ownership exceeded concentrated ownership firms by 3% per
year;
WHEREAS, research
confirms that sustained superior performance is due to contributions across
a broad range of employee skills, along with shared values within a firm,
and not to the efforts of a single employee;
RESOLVED, that the
Board limit the stock options received: 1) by any single executive officer
to no more 5% of the total options granted in a single year, and 2) by
the group of executive officers to no more than 10% of the total options
granted in a single year.
SUPPORTING STATEMENT
Disneys executive compensation policies have failed to deliver their
promise of enhanced shareholder returns. While executives have become
rich, shareholders have suffered mediocre returns over the last six years.
It is time for the company to try a different approach. The financial
benefits of broad-based employee ownership are well documented and offer
an attractive alternative to the current failed policies of concentrating
stock ownership in the hands of a few corporate leaders.
Last year, 9.8% of
shareholders supported this resolution.
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